I. Cultural Analysis and Its Discontents

The issue of culture has been at the center of critical and literary-critical studies for quite some time now, and nowhere has it been more prominent than in the influential form of literary criticism that has come to be known as the "new historicism." Like virtually everyone else who has written on this topic, let me hasten to add that I fully recognize the difficulty of summarizing convincingly the project of the new historicism given both the diversity of the work of those who have been labeled new historicists and the multifaceted nature of the project itself. But certainly one of the most important contributions of the new historicists lies in the insistence and persuasiveness with which they have argued for the central importance of culture not only in relation to literary studies but to the human sciences in general.

New historicists were frequently criticized, at least initially, for a perceived failure to articulate the methodological or theoretical bases for their work. It was nonetheless obvious from the beginning that what was "new" about the new historicism was an implicit frustration with the limitations of previous attempts to understand and describe the relation of cultural artifacts of all sorts--literary, theatrical, visual, and so forth--to the historical forces and subjects they had been thought by previous literary historians merely to reflect. The initial work of the new historicists was rooted in an always implicit but at times explicit critique of older forms of historicism that saw culture as the expression of the unified worldview of a particular historical period or social group or class. But it also implied a critique and even a rejection of psychological and psychoanalytic theories insofar as they saw particular cultural artifacts as the expression or reflection of an individual psyche. From the perspective of Stephen Greenblatt and others, culture could no longer be considered merely the mirror of so-called deeper political forces and powers but must be seen instead as a political force or power [End Page 457] in its own right. But neither could culture be interpreted in terms of what Greenblatt called the "romantic assumptions" of psychoanalysis and especially the "dream of authentic possession," which he asserted lay behind Freud's view of the alienated self. ¹

The new historicists' general view of culture and power has been widely accepted, even by severe critics of the movement such as Jean Howard, Carolyn Porter, and Theodore Leinwand. My purpose here is not to review the numerous provocative discussions of the new historicism that have focused for the most part on the relation of new historicism to other forms of literary, historical, or cultural analysis and criticism. ² The issue I propose to examine is the somewhat different one of the relationship between psychoanalysis and cultural analysis. In this particular
context it concerns not only the relation of the work of the new historicists to psychoanalytic
theory in general but also to the work of the theorist who has been identified by Greenblatt and
others as having provided a major impetus for their own rethinking of culture: Michel Foucault. 3

In the case of the new historicists, the question of the relation between cultural analysis and
psychoanalysis arises naturally in connection with their vision of how power "subjects," that is
to say, how power imposes itself on, or even better, forms or creates individual subjects. In his
epilogue to Renaissance Self-Fashioning, for example, Greenblatt describes the implications of
his theory of power for the notion of subjectivity:

When I first conceived this book several years ago . . . it seemed to me the very hallmark of the
Renaissance that middle-class and aristocratic males began to feel that they possessed [a]
shaping power over their lives, and I saw this power and the freedom it implied as an important
element in my own sense of myself. But as my work progressed, I perceived that fashioning
oneself and being fashioned by cultural institutions--family, religion, state--were inseparably
intertwined. . . . Indeed, the human subject itself began to seem remarkably unfree, the
ideological product of the relations of power in a particular society. 4

The view expressed here by Greenblatt concerning the "fashioning" of the subject by the power
of political and cultural institutions provides the basis for the assertion he makes in the striking
and often-cited final line of another essay, "Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and Its
Subversion": "There is subversion, no end of subversion, only not for us." 5 In Greenblatt's
terms, there is "no end of subversion" of power relations if we adopt the perspective of the
historian and look at configurations of power other than the ones in which we find ourselves. But
there is no subversion "for us," because our subjectivity is a product [End Page 458] of the
particular cultural power that in reality fashions each of us, however tenacious the illusion that
we fashion ourselves may be. Any subversion of that power configuration by "us"--and
ultimately this means by any human subject or group of subjects--can thus only reinforce it.
Here Greenblatt asserts forcefully that the conclusions he draws concerning power from his
reading of Shakespeare are applicable not only to the Elizabethan society that served as the
immediate historical context for Shakespeare's plays but to culture and society in general.

The critical intent and effect of the new historicist's view of how culture and power shape the
subject are undeniable if one contrasts it to more traditional views, which tend to abstract the
subject from culture and examine the impact of the latter on the subject from a position of
exteriority. At another level, however, Greenblatt's and other similar accounts of the fashioning
of the self in the English Renaissance or in any historical period clearly presuppose a subject--
one unified in and through the process of subjection.

To the "romanticism" of theories that place the individual subject outside or beyond culture,
Greenblatt opposes an ostensibly realistic view of the subjection of the individual to culture, a
view which he depicts himself as accepting only reluctantly and at the cost of what he professes
to be his most cherished beliefs or desires. Thus he writes in the epilogue to Renaissance Self-
Fashioning of his "overwhelming need to sustain the illusion that I am the principal maker of my
own identity" (RS 257). The pathos expressed in this confession is a notable feature of
Greenblatt's position, and its function is not only to testify to the disinterested nature of his
critical enterprise. It also serves to discredit alternative views of the subject, particularly of a
psychological or psychoanalytic type, on the grounds that they presumably spring from the very
same "unquenchable" but ultimately illegitimate desire for "authentic self-possession" or
authentic self-fashioning to which Greenblatt himself readily--perhaps too readily--confesses. 6

When considered from the standpoint of psychoanalysis, Greenblatt's descriptions of the process
through which culture fashions the subject invite an obvious objection. That objection, however,
would not be based on what Greenblatt calls the romantic myth of an autonomous subject,
because what is presupposed both by such a myth and by Greenblatt himself is the unity of the subject. From a psychoanalytic perspective, such unity is precisely what cannot be assumed.

In invoking psychoanalysis here, I am referring to the theory not only of Freud but also—and more important, as far as new historicism is concerned—to what I would call Michel Foucault's critical "dialogue" with Freud. The central element of that dialogue lies in Foucault's [End Page 459] multifaceted analysis of the relation between pleasure and power. There is no question but that this analysis supports Greenblatt's interpretation of the subjection of the subject in important ways. In the following examination of the implications of Foucault's work in relation to psychoanalysis, two consequences of his analysis of the relation between pleasure and power will become apparent. The first is that the psychic and the cultural cannot be simply opposed to each other, for power is not merely imposed on or exercised by individuals. As his new historical and other commentators have repeatedly reminded us, Foucault frequently asserts that what has traditionally been thought of as the most intimate, most subjective dimension of human subjectivity, pleasure or eros, is not merely opposed to power. Rather power takes root in the individual in and through libidinal forces. In contrast to figures like Marcuse and Reich, Foucault thus argues that the expression of libidinal forces is not subversive in itself but can serve to reinforce a given power configuration.

This is only one of the implications of Foucault's view that power and pleasure are inseparable, however. Another is that it is never clear if a given power relation serves the interests of power or of pleasure. Nor is it clear that these two aims, however intertwined they may be, ever converge. In this sense no ultimate principle determines the process by which power (or is it pleasure?) creates the subject, and the process itself is never fixed or finished. Foucault invokes the image of the spiral in order to argue that the "subject" of power and pleasure is a complex one which cannot be identified simply with any determined form of culture or specific configuration of power. Foucault's interest in psychoanalysis, which could in no way be considered a simple "return to Freud," also does not reflect a desire to place the subject beyond the reach of culture. If Foucault gives a central place to the relation between pleasure and power in his analysis of culture, it is in order to stress the complexity of the individual subject and the correspondingly unpredictable effects, even or especially the cultural effects, of power itself.

As much as the new historicists owe to Foucault, their borrowing from his work has been a selective one and has resulted, however indirectly, in some serious transformations. Nowhere have they been more selective than in relation to the psychoanalytic dimension of Foucault's work. This selectiveness is all the more ironic, given the new historicists' focus on the English (especially Elizabethan) monarchy. For Foucault's description of the French monarchy in Discipline and Punish is where his involvement with psychoanalysis is the most evident. 2

As many have noted and as Greenblatt himself explicitly states, the Elizabethan monarchy is for him a model of the containment of all potential critical or subversive elements in and by a "culture-as-power" [End Page 460] that leaves room for no authentic alternatives. 3 In his portrait of the classical French monarchy in Discipline and Punish, on the other hand, Foucault describes something very different—the subversion (or subversions) of cultural and political authority. The contrast between these two perspectives on power relates to something more than historical differences, which unquestionably exist, between the two regimes. If anything, what is striking about Foucault's portrait of the pre-Revolutionary monarchy is that it goes against the received historical tradition, which typically has depicted the French monarchy from the reign of Louis XIII on as having consolidated royal power to an unprecedented extent and as embodying monarchy in its most absolute form.

Ultimately, then, what distinguishes Foucault's ancien régime from Greenblatt's Elizabethan monarchy is the contrast between Foucault's and Greenblatt's perspectives on power, a contrast directly connected to the role that Foucault's interpretation of psychoanalysis plays in his argument. Foucault's critical involvement with psychoanalysis provides him with the elements
for his complex model of the subject, and this model in turn provides the basis for the subversion of power in *Discipline and Punish*. Despite what is suggested by Greenblatt when he links his own project to the work of Foucault, there is much that is subversive in Foucault's description of the classical French monarchy, even or perhaps especially for the new historicists.

My point, however, is not that a new historicist or the new historicists have forgotten Foucault or gotten Foucault, or some part of Foucault, wrong. It is true that they have for the most part avoided discussion of the Foucaultian model they have borrowed, thus implying that there is something unproblematic about that model and about their relationship to it. Ultimately, however, the more important, albeit related issue is that of how persuasive and productive the new historicist interpretation of culture is. If one compares the new historicist approach to power with that of Foucault, what is striking is not only the similarity in the manner in which they assimilate culture and power but also that from this assimilation they have derived such contrary conclusions--as exemplified in Greenblatt's portrait of the Elizabethan monarchy on the one hand and in Foucault's portrait of the classical French monarchy on the other.

The immediate purpose of the analysis of *Discipline and Punish* that follows is thus to make explicit what I see as an implicit dialogue with Freud that shapes many aspects of Foucault's position, a dialogue whose implications become especially clear when *Discipline and Punish* is contrasted with the work of Greenblatt and other new historicists. My broader purpose is to contribute to the investigation of the possible role or roles that can be played by psychoanalysis in relation to historical and cultural analysis, of which new historicism represents an important, though obviously not the only possible, example. I will argue that Foucault's dialogue with Freud represents a significant alternative to traditional theories of culture that assume a simple opposition between individual and collectivity, self and society. But I would also argue that it represents an equally significant alternative to new historical theories of culture that assume a self determined by culture. For Foucault, the unity of the psyche is highly problematical, and as a result the psyche remains a locus of resistance to cultural and social forms that strive to be all-determining, even though or rather precisely because it cannot be separated from them.

II. Pleasure and the Subversion of Power in *Discipline and Punish*

A passage from the *History of Sexuality* that has attracted the attention of many of Foucault's interpreters is strongly suggestive of the manner in which Foucault links the subversion of power to a complex, open model of subjectivity:

The medical examination, the psychiatric investigation, the pedagogical report, and family controls may have the over-all and apparent objective of saying no to all wayward or unproductive sexualities, but the fact is that they function as mechanisms with a double impetus: pleasure and power. The pleasure that comes of exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies, searches out, palpates, brings to light; and on the other hand the pleasure that kindles at having to evade this power, flee from it, fool it, or travesty it. The power that lets itself be invaded by the pleasure it is pursuing; and opposite it, power asserting itself in the pleasure of showing off, scandalizing, or resisting. Capture and seduction, confrontation and mutual reinforcement. . . . These attractions, these evasions, these circular incitements have traced around bodies and sexes, not boundaries not to be crossed, but perpetual spirals of power and pleasure. 10

Foucault's use of the image of the spiral in this passage is significant because of the contrast it offers with another metaphor, the circle, which Foucault has used to describe a very different, "panoptic" form of power, characteristic, he argues, of social relations in post-Revolutionary France. What is "circular" about panoptic power is its production or reinforcement of
subjectivity and its absorption of all alternative elements, including pleasure, into the
construction of the closed system of subjectivity and power. In contrast, the image of the spiral
evoked by Foucault in the passage quoted above suggests that the relation of power and pleasure
can also be understood in terms of an exchange that does [End Page 462] not take the form of a
determined configuration of power or of a determined form of the subject.

Foucault is obviously not arguing in this or any other passage from his work that what makes
this spiral a spiral and not a circle is simply the play of pleasure, which continually and
inevitably subverts power. Even in a spiral there is a "mutual reinforcement" of power and
pleasure whose effect can clearly be to confirm or affirm power. But the image of the spiral also
suggests that this is not what all pleasure does, that the "invasions" and "evasions," "scandals"
and "resistances" of the pleasure and power relationship are not necessarily symmetrical.
Foucault's aim here and elsewhere is not merely to show the way pleasure reinforces power but
also "the way in which different instances and stages in the transmission of power [are] caught
up in the very pleasure of their exercise." 11 To be "caught up" in pleasure suggests that power
finds itself in a "spiral," which does not inevitably culminate in the affirmation of power.

There is clearly an intended provocation in Foucault's thesis concerning power and pleasure and
a corresponding outrageousness in works like Discipline and Punish, which elaborate the
implications of that thesis. For an important effect of Foucault's analysis of the contamination of
pleasure and power is to create a place for sadomasochism at the center of his psychocultural
theory. This sadomasochism, however, is not to be confused with S/M, which I would define as
the more or less ritualized sets of sexual practices involving domination and humiliation that
have been both defended and criticized in recent theoretical debates. My focus here (and, I
would argue, the focus of Foucault in the greater part of his work) is on an eroticization of all
relations of authority or power.

The image of the spiral strongly suggests that the sadomasochism Foucault is evoking cannot be
wholly analyzed or understood in terms of any punctual model of subjectivity. But the
connection between sadomasochism, a complex model of subjectivity, and the subversion of
power can be more fully clarified if Foucault's sadomasochistic model of power relations is both
compared and contrasted with certain aspects of Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex. Freud's
essay on "The Economic Problem of Masochism" 12 suggests itself as a preliminary basis for
such a comparison and contrast, because this is a text where Freud himself examines the
significance of the contamination, not only of pleasure and displeasure, but also of pleasure and
power. In this as in other texts, Freud is particularly interested in one specific form of power--the
power of the father. According to Freud, this form of power, as a result of the resolution of the
Oedipus complex, is transformed into authority through a process in which power or authority is
dissociated from pleasure. [End Page 463]

Freud writes in this text of the negative consequences of the failure to achieve such a
dissociation: "conscience and morality have arisen through the overcoming, the desexualization,
of the Oedipus complex; but through moral masochism morality becomes sexualized once more,
the Oedipus complex is revived and the way is opened for a regression from morality to the
Oedipus complex. This is to the advantage neither of morality nor of the person concerned"
(169). From a Foucaultian standpoint this passage is particularly significant inasmuch as the
aspect of the Oedipus complex that Freud argues is reactivated by (sado)masochism is not the
one he was to emphasize most frequently: the love of the mother and the complementary
hostility toward the father. It is rather a "wish to have a passive (feminine) sexual relation" with
the father (169), a wish which, at least in the case of the boy, directly sexualizes what is
"normally" a nonsexual relation, first, to the father and subsequently, to authority.

For Freud himself, this sadomasochistic wish is a much more serious obstacle to a successful
resolution of the Oedipus complex than conflict with the father. In fact, when contrasted with
sadomasochism, Oedipal conflict can be seen to be a positive factor in the resolution of the
Oedipus complex. Such conflict contributes decisively to the desexualization of the relationship to authority by facilitating the investment of its erotic element wholly in the relation to the mother and the hostile element in the relation to the father. It thus plays a major role in the formation of the impersonal, male superego, and therefore in the formation of the normal, adult, masculine subject, who comes into existence when the authority or power of the father is desexualized.

Foucault would certainly agree with Freud that sadomasochism poses a much more genuine obstacle than Oedipal conflict alone to the resolution of the Oedipus complex and the formation of the subject. But whereas Freud stresses the disadvantages of sadomasochism both for the individual and for the institution of legitimate authority, Foucault stresses the critical and theoretical "advantages" of viewing power relations from the perspective of a generalized sadomasochism. Some might argue that the wish that for Freud lies at the basis of sadomasochism would tend to reinforce rather than present a challenge to paternal authority. But Foucault suggests that the eroticization of power relations undercuts authority by disrupting the process of desexualization which is its foundation. Though in Freud's work the theory of the Oedipus complex was perhaps never in serious danger of being replaced by a theory of sadomasochism, "The Economic Problem of Masochism" is already suggestive of what could be called a Foucaultian psychoanalytic theory in which a sadomasochistic paradigm plays a role as central if not more central than that of the Oedipus complex. Foucault's interest in sadomasochism is clearly connected with its potentially subversive significance in relation both to authority and the formation of subjectivity.

From Foucault's perspective a second, equally significant aspect of Freud's account of the overcoming of the Oedipus complex lies in Freud's views concerning what he called "introjection," a process intimately connected for Freud to the desexualization of the relation to authority. In his Group Psychology, Freud relates the introjection of the authority figure or figures to the existence of what he calls "two pieces" of the psyche, the ego and the superego. The process of repression supposes the existence of two such pieces from the moment we conceive of it as interior rather than exterior to the psyche. Certain neurotic disorders such as melancholia, in which the two pieces become discernible as distinct, even hostile entities, offer some of the most striking proof of the existence of introjection, which Freud also calls a "displacement inwards" of the authority figure (108).

Foucault's description of the methods of incarceration and discipline in post-Revolutionary France marks the point in Discipline and Punish (and perhaps even in his whole work) where he is the most critical of Freud, insofar as he uses that description to argue that neither the interiorized, Oedipal form of authority nor the subjectivity it produces are universal, that both are the creations of a particular historical period. An aspect of Foucault's portrait of the classical monarchy is also obviously related to this argument about the historical nature of interiorization and represents an attempt to elaborate a contrasting model of power based on an exterior mode of relation. In Foucault's description of the classical monarchy what were for Freud the two pieces of the (interiorized) relation to authority are identified for the most part with two actors in the social drama--the king and his subjects. In a sense, then, the "pieces" or agents who figure in Discipline and Punish appear more radically distinct than do Freud's, even when Freud wrote of their separation and conflict, as in the case of the melancholic. For Foucault they have become actors in a drama that has an irreducible, exterior, and sociocultural dimension.

The emphasis Foucault places on the social nature of the relation to authority should not be allowed to obscure the point that Foucault is not merely rejecting Freud's psychoanalytic model, however. It would be more accurate to say that Foucault is defending a complex, Freudian model of the subject against Freud himself in order to use that model to argue for the complexity of sociocultural as well as psychic relations. For what Freud's model of the unconscious constantly risks doing, from Foucault's perspective, is reinstating a simple form of subjectivity.
by creating a hierarchy between the superego and the ego and thereby unifying the psyche in terms of the psychic "piece" that is seen as dominant.

At the opposite pole, a model of power relations such as that proposed by the new historicists risks instituting a reductive concept of the subject (and of culture) by positing, at least within the framework of a specific historical period, the existence of social hierarchies that are seen as rigid and determining of subjectivity. Foucault's account of the supplices stands in marked contrast to both of these alternative accounts of the relation to authority. Foucault defines the supplices as public "spectacles" involving punishments which were "painful to a more or less horrible degree" (DP 33). One intent of such spectacles was clearly to impose or reinforce royal authority. But Foucault argues that despite that intent, the supplices involved a "whole aspect of the carnival, in which roles were inverted, authority mocked and criminals transformed into heroes" (DP 61, translation modified). In this and other passages in which the supplices are described, Foucault is proposing both a psychoanalysis and a cultural analysis in which the subject is not and cannot be definitively unified, precisely because there is no fixed, rigid hierarchy governing the relation between the two "pieces" or agents of the psycho-cultural drama and, given this lack of hierarchy, implicitly no way of fully "interiorizing" or "exteriorizing" power relations.

The relation between the monarch and her or his subjects has been a central focus of the analyses of the new historicists, who have frequently highlighted the shrewdness with which individual English monarchs manipulated or are depicted as having manipulated cultural symbols and forms in order to advance their political projects and assert royal power. As Louis Montrose writes in the conclusion to his interpretation of the pastoral pageants invented under the reign of Queen Elizabeth: "The charisma of Queen Elizabeth was not compromised but was rather enhanced by royal pastoral's awesome intimacy, its sophisticated quaintness. Such pastorals were minor masterpieces of a poetics of power." The success Montrose and other new historicists attribute to the English monarchs in this respect is obviously not merely a question of individual skill or shrewdness, however, but rather a necessary outcome of the particular model of power they have constructed. For them, the Renaissance spectacle is one in which power is on stage and those subjected to power are in the audience, and it is the fixed nature of the opposition between spectator and spectacle and ultimately between social superior and social inferior that gives power its inevitable stability.

In Foucault's account of French classical power, on the other hand, the Ludovician monarch, whom so many have identified as the primary exemplar of royal absolutism, becomes in certain respects the most fragile incarnation of authority imaginable. This is precisely because the effects of the spectacles of punishment were frequently the opposite of the one presumably intended by royal power: "Thus out of the ceremony of the public execution, out of that uncertain festival in which violence was instantaneously reversible, it was this solidarity [between the spectators and the criminal] much more than the sovereign power that was likely to emerge with redoubled strength" (DP 63, translation slightly modified). According to Foucault, the position and authority of the king were at risk in the spectacles of punishment, either figuratively or, in the case of those executions that the spectators prevented from being carried out, literally. In Foucault's description of the supplices, all of the roles that oppose superiors--those staging the executions--to inferiors--those watching them--are described in terms of a "ricochet" of power relationships, which clearly anticipates the "spiral" described in the Introduction to his History of Sexuality. In other words, these relationships were always potentially subject to reversal, without it being clear that any specific instance of reversal confirmed any specific power--including the power of the monarch.

This sense of the reversibility of hierarchical relationships is strengthened by an image evoked more than once by Foucault to describe the supplices--the "corps-à-corps." In its normal meaning of "hand-to-hand" combat, this expression implies that in the spectacles of punishment the potential for a reversal of the various positions in the social hierarchy became so great that
the idea of hierarchy and the forms of subjectivity associated with social hierarchy ceased to be pertinent. It is as if these encounters are more accurately described as a contest between two parties either one of which could have emerged as the dominant one. Foucault's descriptions of the supplices are studded with terms such as "joust," "duel," "battle," and "challenge" which relate to the idea of the supplices as contest.

But the expression "corps-à-corps" has a more literal meaning--"body-to-body"--through which Foucault appears to suggest that the supplices had an erotic dimension and that the reversibility of the power relations structuring them is or was closely connected to it. Foucault's insistence on the centrality of the body throughout his description of the classical spectacles of punishment should be understood in this light. According to Foucault, the role of the body in these spectacles is not merely to provide power with a locus or an object for its imposition. Power, which invests itself in the body, is also, as Foucault puts it elsewhere, "exposed to a counterattack in that same body" because of a certain pleasure connected with the body, even in atrocious "festivals" such as those described by Foucault. In a chapter of Discipline and Punish entitled "The Body of the Condemned," Foucault contrasts the methods of punishment used by the classical age with those that were to be introduced in the nineteenth century, observing that in the latter period "one no longer touched the body" (DP 15). His implication is clear. Under the ancien régime the body was "touched," it occupied a central position in the somber spectacle of punishment. The ambiguity of the word "touch" is significant in this connection, since it evokes as much an erotic gesture as a violent one. That the supplices possessed an erotic dimension is also implied when Foucault writes that nineteenth-century methods of punishment were more "pudiques"--more modest or chaste--than those of the classical age.

The suggestion that the classical spectacle of punishment possessed an erotic dimension is one of the most provocative made by Foucault. But here as in many other instances, the provocation is directly connected to his view of the subversive implications of sadomasochism, and more specifically to the reversal of the various relations structuring the spectacles of punishment--the relation between the spectators and the criminal, between the king and the criminal, and between the spectators and the king. The nineteenth-century reformers are depicted as having understood the connection between the latent erotic dimension of classical punishment and its potentially subversive effects perfectly well--and as having sought to suppress both simultaneously. According to Foucault, they feared the effect of the classical "ritual" of punishment, which was supposed to "conclude" crime, would be "to make the executioner resemble a criminal, judges murderers, to reverse roles at the last moment, to make the tortured criminal an object of pity or admiration" (DP 9). Obviously in Foucault's view the classical spectacle of punishment did do all these things, and in doing so confirmed that the suppression of the role of the body in nineteenth-century methods of punishment stemmed not only from a humanitarian impulse but also from a desire to suppress a certain sadomasochism and its destabilizing effects on authority and hierarchy.

"Body language" thus plays an important role throughout Foucault's account of classical punishment, but it is perhaps most striking in his description of the specific relation of the king to the supplices. In fact, one of the most curious aspects of Foucault's depiction of the king lies in his insistence on the "material" as well as the "mythic" presence of the king in the spectacle of punishment--that is, on the role played in the supplices by what Foucault calls the "body of the king" (DP 210). Foucault himself indirectly acknowledges how bizarre his own assertion is concerning the king's material presence when he qualifies it as "strange" (DP 210). But precisely because this view of the king is so implausible, it serves to underscore all the more strongly the connection between Foucault's portrait of the king and the sadomasochistic paradigm underlying it. It is thanks to his strange material presence that the spectacles of punishment take on their erotic dimension, because without it, the king would be a remote, erotically inaccessible authority. But it is also thanks to this materiality that the king's power can be successfully challenged, precisely because the king's bodily presence in such a public arena
creates an occasion for the subversion of his position through a mixing of pleasure and power.

Foucault even goes so far as to argue that the supplices were dominated by a classical imaginary in which figures such as that of Lancelot (DP 195) were the most prominent. In making this argument he reasserts his contention that the supplices are better understood as epic or heroic contests between two parties who freely engage in combat than as impositions of constraint or displeasure by one party on another. But Foucault goes on to make it clear once again that the meaning of the jousts or the duels of chivalry was as much erotic and psychic as it was conflictual and social, because he immediately compares this heroic-epic figure with the subjects of two of Freud's most famous case studies--little Hans and Judge Schreber (DP 195).

From Foucault's perspective, the story of little Hans, in particular, would no doubt be best understood as an illustration of Freud's Oedipal model of subjectivity, with its separation of the erotic love of the mother from the hostility directed toward the father and its correspondingly desexualized and interiorized relation to authority. By comparing and contrasting the figure of Lancelot with that of little Hans, Foucault is once again highlighting his own model of the "subject." As a noted actor in the "corps-à-corps" of legend, Lancelot stands for Foucault's rejection of psychological or psychoanalytic models which posit a determined form of individual subjectivity based on the subjection of the subject to authority and the desexualization of the authority relation. But he also stands for Foucault's rejection of models which posit a socially determined subjectivity based on fixed relations of power.

III. The Significance of Spectacle for a Foucaultian Psychoanalysis

An important component of the work of many new historicists has been their analysis of the role of a specific form of cultural activity in the construction of Renaissance power--a form which they term variously as spectacle, display, or theater. Consistent with their overall project of analyzing the role played by culture in the creation and affirmation of the power of the Renaissance monarch, Greenblatt, Montrose, and Leonard Tennenhouse, to name only these three, have argued that the [End Page 469] effect of various spectacles, notably the theater but also other pageants and courtly entertainments such as those sponsored by Elizabeth, was quite simply to impose power more forcefully. Greenblatt summarizes this aspect of the new historicist approach to the issue of the visual display of power in a passage in which he also alludes to the work of Foucault: "Power that dreams of a panopticon in which the most intimate secrets are open to the view of an invisible authority, such power will have as its appropriate aesthetic form the realist novel; Elizabethan power, by contrast, depends upon its privileged visibility. . . . [In the Renaissance], royal power is manifested to its subjects as in a theater, and the subjects are at once absorbed by the instructive, delightful, or terrible spectacles, and forbidden intervention or deep intimacy" (IB 108). Thus the visual nature of power serves to impose it more forcefully, to confirm its absolute nature.

Foucault's emphasis on the visual dimension of power is just as striking as that of any new historicist. But it quickly becomes apparent that while Greenblatt may evoke Foucault in defining his own perspective on the spectacle of power, his view diverges seriously from that of Foucault. From the perspective of the latter, the significance of the spectacles of punishment was profoundly ambiguous in relation to the power they were designed to affirm, or even more, it was unequivocally subversive. It has been argued that Foucault's concept of art is a "transgressive" one whose critical potential is exploited throughout Foucault's work and serves as perhaps its most important unifying principle. From such a perspective, the classical spectacles of punishment, whose theatrical qualities are repeatedly affirmed by Foucault, could be and have been interpreted as one of many instances in his work where the aesthetic plays this transgressive role. But it is equally important to understand that Foucault's conception of the transgressive significance of art, especially visual art, is tied to his interpretation of
psychoanalysis and to his critical use of the concept of sadomasochism.

An early text by Foucault, his "Introduction" to the French translation of Ludwig Binswanger's *Dream and Existence* (published in English as *Dream and Existence: Michel Foucault and Ludwig Binswanger*), provides crucial insight into Foucault's view of visual art and helps to explain why the visual character of the classical spectacles of power is for him still another sign of the subversive implication of those spectacles. Though it appeared in 1954, this brief text already fully articulates the critique of Freud and specifically of the repressive hypothesis found in Foucault's subsequent and better-known works. Equally significant, it does so by arguing that the visual dimension of the dream work is disruptive of the model of subjectivity Freud sought to impose through his hermeneutics of dream interpretation. [End Page 470]

Foucault's thesis in this essay is in effect that Freud denied the subversive nature of the dream-work by reducing dream-images to the role of merely hiding and/or expressing the thoughts of an unconscious subject. In contrast, Foucault insists on the irreducibility of image to thought or discourse, the "density" of the image as image (35). Thus, he writes, "one looks in vain in [Freud's] work for a grammar of the imaginary modality, and for an analysis of the expressive act in its necessity" (36), when, from Foucault's standpoint, it is clearly just such a "grammar" and "analysis" that are needed. Just as Foucault was to argue later that the creation of the Oedipal subject is disrupted by the eroticization of the relation to authority, so he argues in this early essay that the psychoanalyst's uncovering of the unconscious subject, whose thoughts are purportedly hidden behind the dream, is at least in principle (if not in practice) interrupted by the visual dimension of dreams. The disruption in question stems for Foucault from the fact that the visual dimension of dreams can never be interpreted--or interpreted away. The visual thus serves as an index of the irreducible complexity of the subject, which cannot be equated with the simple form of it uncovered through the methods of a hermeneutics of dream interpretation.

If one turns to Foucault's description of the classical spectacle of power, it appears that the creation of cultural symbols or images is a central, necessary element in the creation of power itself. The classical age is for Foucault one in which the supplices functioned as a tragic spectacle, and even in the post-Revolutionary period, power could not help but continue to take on a visual form, impoverished though it may have been. But just as the dream-symbol or image cannot be accounted for in terms of a dreaming subject, so implicitly these political and cultural symbols or images could not merely serve as the expressions or embodiments of a specific configuration of power. Whether "repression" is understood in psychic or social terms, the visual subsists as a powerful index of the subversion of the repressive apparatus and the model of subjectivity it implies and even to some extent actualizes. This is why Foucault depicts the nineteenth-century reformers as eager to suppress the visual dimension of punishment along with its corporal and violent dimensions. In the post-Revolutionary age, Foucault argues, "the power to punish no longer dared to manifest itself openly" (*DP* 256). Which is to say that the post-Revolutionary reformers sought to suppress a dimension of classical power that not only led to subversion but that was in and of itself subversive, insofar as the visual dimension of the representation of power interrupts and complicates the formation of any subject, including the subject of power. [End Page 471]

**IV. The Rabble Within**

Still another major difference in the perspective of Foucault and the new historicists concerns the role of those Foucault calls *le peuple* and Greenblatt calls "masterless men" (IB 95) in the representation of power. The issue of the social background of the audience for the spectacles through which new historicists have claimed that power projected itself in Elizabethan England is not explicitly central in the work of prominent new historicists. And yet it is implicitly of crucial importance, as an article like Greenblatt's "Invisible Bullets" reveals. In this essay he notes that, like other groups in English society, "masterless men" are represented in plays such
as Shakespeare's Henry IV part one, but, he argues, their role is only to serve as the objects of a process of "study, discipline, correction, transformation" initiated by the monarchy (IB 92).

Similarly, Prince Hal's frequentation of these masterless men and his study of their language leads to his acquisition of a fluency whose only purpose in the end is to "understand and control the lower classes" (IB 100). Greenblatt suggests, moreover, that the purpose in question is achieved almost effortlessly through the theatrical display of power. The reasons for this become evident when Greenblatt invokes a statement that Thomas More imagines being uttered by the common people, to the effect that all displays of authority are (or were) "king's games, as it were stage plays, and for the more part played upon scaffolds. In which poor men be but the lookers on. And they that wise be will meddle no farther" (IB 108). Greenblatt uses this quotation to argue that insofar as the lower classes are present in the spectacles of power, whether exceptionally, as characters in the play, or implicitly, as members of the audience, the effect of the representation of power is to confirm power all the more strongly by excluding them from the group that exercises it.

In contrast, Foucault argues that the participation of le peuple in the spectacle of punishment had a subversive meaning, as can be seen throughout Discipline and Punish, but perhaps most clearly in the conclusion to Part One. There Foucault describes two scenes of punishment, one of which is carried out according to the rules regulating the spectacle of punishment under the ancien régime, the other of which already anticipates the set of rules that were to come into force in the post-Revolutionary period. In the first, which takes place at the end of the seventeenth century, the crowd participates directly in a scene of punishment and even determines its outcome, since the people end up rescuing the condemned criminal, beating up the executioner, and tearing apart the scaffold (DP 64). In the second, the crowd is present. But a large contingent of soldiers is also present to keep it at a safe distance from the execution and prevent it from subverting the prescribed outcome.

In Foucault's terms, the difference between these two scenes reveals, among other things, the subversive meaning of the presence of le peuple as witnesses and participants in the spectacle of punishment. The irony, of course, is that, in Foucault's account, the true subversion of power is not carried out by the French Revolution. The second scene occurs in 1775 and, Foucault suggests, it already set the stage for the emergence of a disciplinary paradigm that was to be sustained by the Revolution even if it was the creation of monarchy. But while some might argue that occasional reversals of the outcome of an intended execution by the crowd were events with only fleeting, local significance under the ancien régime, Foucault holds that such apparently marginal events were in reality crucial. They revealed a possibility of subversion generated by the participation of le peuple in the spectacle of power, a possibility that the ancien régime could not fail to display in imposing its power on le peuple. Clearly for Foucault, one of the most important reasons why the nineteenth-century reformers of the judicial system and of prisons "no longer dared to manifest [their power] openly" (DP 256) was because they understood full well the subversive implications of the participation of le peuple in the display of power.

Foucault and the new historicists thus obviously differ in how they interpret the significance of the presence of le peuple in the various arenas in which power was on display under the English and French monarchies, but this is one instance where the difference bears no obvious relation to either an interest or a lack of interest in psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, the view Foucault presents of le peuple is incomplete if its psychoanalytic dimension is not recognized. It is quite true that Foucault's perspective on the role of le peuple corresponds in many respects to the depiction of the working class and the peasantry in works of social and cultural historians such as Boris Porchenoev or Emmanuel Leroi-Ladurie, both of whom are cited more than once in Discipline and Punish. Nonetheless, the difficulty of analyzing Foucault's concept of le peuple in purely social terms is already suggested by the lack of precision of this term.

The English edition of Discipline and Punish translates le peuple as "the people," but this choice
is somewhat misleading insofar as in French *le peuple*, especially in the classical age, connotes a specific group within society rather than society or the nation as a whole, as is the case with "the people." In this sense "the common people" would be a somewhat better translation, but it is still not ideal. What it does not necessarily convey is the pejorative sense in which *le peuple* was most frequently used under the *ancien régime*, a sense that is more accurately captured by a term used by Greenblatt, "masterless men" (IB 95), or, perhaps even better, by another characterization he takes from Thomas Harman—the "rowsy [sic], ragged rabblemint of rakehells" (IB 102). Of course neither Greenblatt's nor Foucault's use of such terms involves any prejudice, precisely because they both valorize the disreputable, unruly, and even disturbing nature of the group these terms designate.

But whereas in Greenblatt's analysis of Elizabethan power, the masterless men remain a specific social group, the idea of *le peuple* as "everyone" is not completely lost in Foucault's description of the spectacles of punishment. Instead, the two senses of *le peuple* merge to create the image of an entity that is at one and the same time socially all-encompassing and yet governed by the mentality of a distinctly isolated or particular social group. Significantly Foucault does not bother to state that aristocratic and bourgeois spectators were either absent from the spectacles of punishment or present in lesser numbers than their social inferiors. His lack of interest in demonstrating the numerical superiority of common people suggests that the real issue is not whether or not members of the upper and middle-class were present. It appears rather that, insofar as they were present, they were absorbed by *le peuple* in a manner that cannot be accounted for in numerical terms alone.

What is suggested by Foucault's descriptions of the role of *le peuple* in the spectacles of punishment is explicitly argued by Foucault in an interview given in 1977, where he asserts that *le peuple* or, in the interview in question, the plebs (*la plèbe*), should not be identified exclusively with a particular social group:

The plebs is no doubt not a real sociological entity. But there is indeed always something in the social body, in classes, groups and individuals themselves, which in some sense escapes relations of power, something which is by no means a more or less docile or reactive primal matter, but rather a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge. There is certainly no such thing as "the" plebs; rather, there is, as it were, a certain plebian quality or aspect. There is plebs in bodies, in souls, in individuals, in the proletariat, in the bourgeoisie, but everywhere in a diversity of forms and extensions, or energies and irreductibilities.  

Foucault's point in this passage is not necessarily that we should dispense with the concepts of class or social group in the analysis of power, but his argument clearly implies that such concepts in and of themselves are insufficient in understanding power and its psychosocial dynamic. Here we see Foucault confirming that the subversion of power is always possible. This is the case precisely because conflict is never purely a function of social relations, that is to say, of relations between social groups or even between individuals. Instead it is rooted as much "in" the individual as it is in society or in the interests of specific groups or classes. This passage not only illustrates the subversive meaning of *le peuple*. It simultaneously affirms once again the importance of the psychological or psychoanalytic dimension of Foucault's cultural analysis.  

**Conclusion: "To Be Fair to Foucault"**

In the end I don't want to suggest that cultural analysis be replaced by psychoanalysis, even if the psychoanalysis in question were one in which the sadomasochist, rather than Oedipus, played the central role. *Discipline and Punish* testifies to the value of considering both the cultural and the psychic from the standpoint of the problem of sadomasochism, but it is important to note that other parts of Foucault's work exemplify the potential limitations of such
an approach. Foucault's *History of Sexuality* offers a case in point. It was certainly no more Foucault's explicit intention to mount a defense of the subject in this work than in any other he wrote. Nonetheless, in Foucault's final treatment of the relation between pleasure and power, his sadomasochistic paradigm takes on a form and function distinctly different from the one it has in *Discipline and Punish*. In Foucault's description of the adult Greek male and his sexual practices, sadomasochism is depicted as leading to the creation of a unified subject, and the sadomasochistic paradigm is used by Foucault to argue for the integrity and the privileged status of that subject.

Traces of the complexity Foucault attributes to the subject in *Discipline and Punish* can be found in *The History of Sexuality*. They are evident in Foucault's description of what for him is the Greek's ultimate achievement--an "aesthetics of existence." This aesthetics is defined by Foucault as a set of "intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria." Sadomasochism is in question once again in this final portrait of (Greek) subjectivity, where Foucault describes the Greek's "self-delimiting domination" of his own being and especially of his own sexual pleasure (184).

Foucault's description of the Greek male thus bears some resemblance to the complex model of subjectivity he elaborates in *Discipline and Punish* insofar as the Greek male's relation to himself is characterized by activity. The aim of that activity is a certain harmony between domination and pleasure, but the very existence of activity also presupposes a tension between them. The complexity of the subjectivity Foucault attributes to the Greek male is not the irreducible one described in *Discipline and Punish*, however. The Greek male's transformation of himself and his stylization of his sexual practices ultimately create a single, unified whole--the Greek male himself, considered as an oeuvre or work of art. In a similar vein, the conflict between pleasure and power is resolved thanks to the aesthetic value of the Greek male's sexual practices and of his very being. In short, the "spiral" has become a "circle," only now its qualities are not those of the panopticon but rather of the supreme figure of harmony and beauty.

The aesthetically or sadomasochistically created unity of the individual Greek male is complemented according to Foucault by the existence of a rigid social hierarchy, in which the dominant position is invariably occupied by the Greek male and the subordinate position by women or slaves. Given the way Foucault uses the sadomasochistic paradigm in *Discipline and Punish* to analyze the reversal of both psychic and social hierarchies, his utter lack of interest in exploring any potential ironies or ambiguities in the relation of adult Greek males to their social inferiors is striking and puzzling. It becomes less puzzling, however, if one considers the differences between the models of subjectivity Foucault adopts in *The History of Sexuality* and *Discipline and Punish* respectively. By choosing to interpret Greek sexual practices in terms of the self-creation of an aestheticized, unified being, Foucault in effect embraces, at least within the scope of a specific historical period and social context, psychic and social hierarchies which, when they are interpreted as fixed and rigid, complement the existence of such a being and make it theoretically plausible. He also reveals, perhaps despite himself, the ambiguity and limitations of his sadomasochistic paradigm.

It could be argued that nowhere in his work is Foucault further from the new historicists than in *The History of Sexuality*, where the subject becomes the ultimate fashioner or creator of his own being. But as *Discipline and Punish* suggests, the opposition between purely psychological and purely cultural models of subjectivity is a false one, precisely because of what they share--a unified model of subjectivity, whether the unity is achieved through a "subjectification" to socio-cultural forces and powers or a (self-)creation by means of aesthetic or ethical practices. In fact, if important parts of *The History of Sexuality* are at odds with anything, it is with Foucault's "own" complex model of subjectivity and with his own, earlier concept of sadomasochism, as
elaborated in *Discipline and Punish* and in much of his other work. [End Page 476]

Insofar as it links a finished, aestheticized model of subjectivity to a portrait of a stable society with a rigid social hierarchy, *The History of Sexuality* offers a striking, albeit negative, confirmation of the connection that exists elsewhere in Foucault's work between a complex model of subjectivity and the possibility of psychic and social subversion. In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault is critical of Freud's theories concerning the interiorization, hierarchization, and desexualization of authority relations because of their link with theories of subjectivity. But, new historical appropriations of his work notwithstanding, in much of his work Foucault is equally critical of a purely social or cultural model of power relations for precisely the same reason. In *Discipline and Punish* we see that the social and cultural are as much internal to the subject as they are external. But for Foucault, this "interiorization" of the cultural does not necessarily consolidate a given cultural configuration. Instead, it opens it up to the conflict between the psychic and the cultural, which is located both "within" culture and "within" the psychic and not just between them. In the end, then, *Discipline and Punish* is as much about the limitations of cultural power as it is about the formation of the subject by the forces of culture. The power that forms the subject is not purely psychic, but neither is it exclusively cultural, and this means that no cultural configuration is ever totally determining. It also means that there is power and reversal, no end to power and reversal, even perhaps for "us."

*University of California, Irvine*

**Suzanne Gearhart** is Professor of French at the University of California, Irvine. She is the author of *The Open Boundary of History and Fiction: A Critical Approach to the French Enlightenment* (1984) and *The Interrupted Dialectic: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Their Tragic Other* (1992). Her current project, *Psychoanalytics of Culture*, explores possible psychoanalytic approaches to issues raised by contemporary cultural theory.

**Notes**


2. See, for example, Murray Krieger's perceptive discussion of both the similarities and differences between old and new historicisms in "Two Faces of an Old Argument: Historicism versus Formalism in American Criticism," in *The Institution of Theory* (Baltimore, 1994), pp. 24-47. Krieger argues that "the New Historicist faces a methodological problem, and ultimately theoretical dilemma: how to claim, as a poststructuralist, the primacy of a dispersed textuality and yet to claim, as a historian, the primacy of brute power relations in a social reality... This dilemma is, for New Historicists, an insoluble chicken-and-egg problem, because priority becomes impossible to assign without forfeiting one half of the double claim of priority that they must make--a claim on behalf of both history and textuality" (p. 42).


Like the final line of "Invisible Bullets," this confessional epilogue also generalizes the conclusion Greenblatt draws from his readings of Shakespeare, Marlowe, and others, asserting that it applies as much to "us" as to the Renaissance subject or, even better, that the Renaissance subject is "us."

Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1979); hereafter cited in text as *DP*.


For example, Jean E. Howard identifies "its failure to reflect on itself" as the main grounds for her reservations about new historicism. Insofar as it limits itself to "the form of the reading, a good deal of this criticism suppresses any discussion of its own methodology and assumptions" (Jean E. Howard, "The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies," in *New Historicism and Renaissance Drama*, p. 220). In his introduction to the *New Historicism Reader*, Aram Veeser brushes aside this objection when he asserts that "the charge made often in the early eighties that NH had failed to theorize itself seems laughably wrong now that meta-critical essays build up like Chinese lacquer around every NH twist and angle" (H. Aram Veeser, "The New Historicism," in *The New Historicism Reader*, ed. H. Aram Veeser [New York, 1994], p. 7). Nonetheless, in terms of the relation between the New Historicists and Foucault, the objection is still by and large valid.


Though Freud's primary subject in this essay is "masochism," his discussion of masochism in its primary form reveals why, even in Freud's own terms, masochism and sadism are inseparable: "If one is prepared to overlook a little inexactitude, it may be said that the death instinct which is operative in the organism--primal sadism--is identical with masochism" (Sigmund Freud, "The Economic Problem of Masochism," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, tr. James Strachey [London, 1953-1966], 19:164; hereafter cited in text). In the light of this passage it appears that for Freud both masochism and sadism are, properly speaking, forms of sadomasochism.


Foucault describes the effects of nineteenth-century methods of discipline and incarceration in terms which strongly evoke Freud's description of the relation between the super-ego and the ego: "He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection" (*Discipline and Punish*, pp. 202-3). This "introjection" of the gaze of the surveillant is nothing less than the creation of "conscience," understood not as a universal feature of human psychology but as the product of a specific, historical situation: "It is not, therefore, an external respect for the law or fear of punishment alone that will act upon the convict but the
workings of conscience itself" (*Discipline and Punish*, p. 238; translation slightly modified).

15. In an essay whose title is a quotation from Foucault, "Etre juste avec Freud" ("To Be Fair to Freud"), Jacques Derrida analyzes the "oscillating" nature of Foucault's relation to Freud. Focusing primarily on Foucault's *Madness and Civilization*, Derrida argues that Foucault's history of madness implies both a critique of Freud and an identification by Foucault of his own critical perspective with that of Freud: "And Freud? why in the same book is he at times associated with, at other times opposed to these great figures who bear witness to madness and to the inordinate, who are also great judges, of us, that is, our judges? Are we also being summoned to appear before Freud?" (Jacques Derrida, "Etre juste avec Freud," in his *Resistances* [Paris, 1996], p. 107; my translation).


18. The English translator has rendered "pudique" as "reticent" (*Discipline and Punish*, p. 15).

19. Leonard Tennenhouse writes of the relation between spectacle and power in a similar vein when he discusses the meaning and implications of the title he has given to his own work on Shakespeare's theater, *Power on Display*: "I have borrowed heavily from the beginning of *Discipline and Punish* where Foucault . . . uses a figure--the scene on the scaffold--to represent a culture where power worked more effectively through theatrical display than through writing. . . . It was not the punishment so much as the *spectacle* of punishment that enforced the power of the state" (Leonard Tennenhouse, *Power on Display* [New York, 1986], pp. 13-14).

20. David Carroll discusses the aesthetic dimension of *Discipline and Punish* and its connection to a general privileging of art and literature that he argues shapes Foucault's critical project as a whole (David Carroll, *Paraesthetics: Foucault/Lyotard/Derrida* [New York, 1987]).


22. "They did have a real importance. Sometimes these movements, which originated from below, spread and attracted the attention of more highly placed persons who, taking them up, gave them a new dimension. . . . More usually, those disturbances maintained around penal justice and its manifestations, which ought to have been exemplary, a state of permanent unrest" (*Discipline and Punish*, p. 62).


24. It is in the name of such conflict, moreover, that Foucault not only challenges "neo-populisms" and "neo-liberalisms," but also those forms of psychoanalysis that posit a unified model of the subject based on a transcendent notion of desire or of discourse. Foucault's challenge to such forms of psychoanalysis echoes his critique of populist socioanalysis. In a dialogue with the supreme guardian of Lacanian orthodoxy, Jacques-Alain Miller, Foucault argued that the political should be conceived as a field of struggle. "Between whom?" asked Miller. Foucault replied, "I would say it's all against all. There aren't immediately given subjects of the struggle, one the proletariat and the other the bourgeoisie. Who fights against whom? . . . Individuals, or even sub-individuals." "Sub-individuals?" asked Miller. "Why not?" replied Foucault (Foucault, "The Confession of the Flesh," in *Power/Knowledge*, p. 208). Greenblatt's statement that only a Lacanian psychoanalysis is compatible with his own perspective on culture
and power thus marks an additional point where he and Foucault diverge markedly (Greenblatt, "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture," p. 221).


26. As Jean Grimshaw notes in her essay "Practices of Freedom," in *Up against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions between Foucault and Feminism*, ed. Caroline Ramazanoglu (New York, 1993), pp. 51-72. That the potential ironies or ambiguities of the relations of adult Greek males to each other are similarly neglected by Foucault is equally, if not even more puzzling. For a fuller discussion, analysis, and critical assessment of these issues see my article, "Foucault's Response to Freud: Sado-Masochism and the Aestheticization of Power," *Style*, 6, no. 3 (Fall 1995), 389-403.